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Tax poLicy toward the overseas income of U.S. firms is an
important issue since foreign investment accounts for a sizabLe fraction of
total investment by U.S. firms. At present there is no consensus on the
degree to which U.S. firms respond to tax incentives when making internationaL
investment decisions. This paper seeks to shed light on this issue.
Because the tax systems of (at least) two countries are involved,
the specification of tax incentives is far from trivial. For example, U.S.
treatment is based on the foreign tax credit mechanism.. In its purest form,
this mechanism would insure that the net tax rate on all income of U.S. firms
would be equal to the U.S. rate, rendering the tax rates in the host countries
irrelevant.
In fact, actual U.S. tax practice is far removed from an idealized
foreign tax credit mechanism. For instance the U.S. tax is not colLected
until income is repatriated from abroad; section I points out that deferral
changes the incentive effects in fundamental ways. Foreign income tax rates
definitely do matter in theory; in fact, they may be of overriding importance.
The remainder of the paper seeks to test these theoretical
considerations. First,we describe the cross—section data that were collected
for this purpose. Then, we report the result that U.S. firms respond to net
rates of return in general and to properly specified tax rates in particular.
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Washington, D.C. 20220Tax policy toward the overseas income of U.S. firms is a
complicated issue, and its effects are not well understood.
These effects may be important, however, since foreign invest-
ment accounts for a sizable fraction of total investment by
U.S. firms. Many basic questions remain to be answered in this
field; for example, there is no consensus on the degree to
which U.S. firms respond to tax incentives when making inter-
national investment decisions. This paper seeks to shed light
on this issue.
The first step is to specify the tax incentives as
correctly as possible. Because the tax systems of (at least)
two countries are involved in each investment decision, this
step is far from trivial. For example, U.S. treatment is based
on the foreign tax credit mechanism. In its purest form, this
mechanism would insure that the net tax rate on all income of
U.S. firms would be equal to the U.S. rate, no matter where the
investment takes place; this pure system would obviously make
the tax rates in the host countries irrelevant.
In fact, actual U.S. tax practice is far removed from an
idealized foreign tax credit mechanism. A major departure is
that U.S. tax is not collected until income is repatriated from
abroad to the U.S. parent firm; this feature is referred to as
"deferral." Section I points out that deferral changes the
incentive effects in fundamental ways. Foreign income tax
rates definitely do turn out to matter; in fact, they may be of
overriding importance.—2--
The remainder of the paper seeks to test the theoretical
considerations laid out in Section I. Specifically, it meas-
ures the impact of U.S. and foreign taxes on the distribution
of overseas investment by U.S. firms. Section II describes the
cross—section data that were constructed for this purpose.
Section III presents the results. We find that U.S. firms
respond to net rates of return in general and to properly
specified tax rates in particular. There is a brief concluding
section.
I. Incentives of U.S. and Foreign Taxes
The basic point of this section is very simple -—invest-
ment decisions are determined by the after tax rates of return
that are available. However, the complexity of taxes impinging
on the international investment decisions of U.S. firms makes
the application of this point far from trivial. In order to
concentrate on the empirical evidence, we will discuss only
briefly the tax situations and their effects on investment
decisions. For a more rigorous development of these ideas, see
Hartman (1981a).
The host country governments have the first opportunity to
tax the income earned within their borders by U.S. investors.
Typically, this income is subjected to the same corporate
income tax that the local firms pay. The rate of return after
the country's foreign income tax, r*flfj, is therefore given by
equation (1).
r*fj =r*(l_t*) (1)—3—
When the income from these investments is actually repatriated
to the U.S. parent, an additional tax, called a "withholding
tax" may be levied by the host government. Designating this
withholding tax by the rate of return net of all foreign
taxes is given by r*flf in equation (2).
rflf =r*(lt*)(l_t*w) (2)
When these dividends are received by the U.S. parent firm, the
U.S. government may tax them. In order to avoid the double
taxation which otherwise would be implied by the collection of
U.S. tax, the United States gives a credit for the foreign
taxes paid, up to the rate of the U.S. tax which would be due.
Thus, on a repatriated dollar of earnings, the net of total tax
rate of return can be indicated by r*n in equation (3).
r* =r*(l_t),if (lt)<(l_t*)(l_t*w), (3)
=r*(l_t*)(l_t*w),otherwise.
The effective rate of taxation, to which a U.S. investor
should respond in making its foreign investment decisions, is,
therefore, a complicated concept. In particular, the tax rate
depends on the firms's repatriation decisions, as well as its
location of investment decisions. At each point in time, the
firm earns an after—tax rate of r*flfj on each dollar it retains
abroad, and r*n on each dollar it repatriates. What rate, or
combination of rates, should enter into the firm's investment
decisions? This issue has often been resolved in empirical
studies by simply taking a weighted average of the applicable
tax rates as shown in equation (4).
rnp =r*[l_(l_p)t*_ptj,If (lt)<(1_t*)(l_t*w), (4)
r*[l_t*_pt*w(l_t*)], otherwise—4—
where p is the fraction of earnings ordinarily repatriated.
That is, the effective rate of return is taken to be a weighted
average of rfj and r*.
The Hartman (1981a) paper points out problems with this
formulation. Consider a parent firm receiving dividends from a
foreign subsidiary while at the same time expanding its
investment abroad with an explicit transfer of funds. This
action is clearly suboptirnal; there is no change in the net
financial position of either parent or subsidiary, yet extra
taxes (withholding taxes and/or a net tax payment to the U.S.)
will have to be paid on the dividends. By refraining from re-
patriation while expanding abroad, the firm can defer these
taxes. When the desired level of overseas investment is less
than overseas earnings, then repatriation should occur. It is
clear that no firm should simply repatriate a constant fraction
"p" of its overseas earnings each period. Therefore, the
weighted average rule seems seriously deficient.
Rather, the required rate of return on foreign investments
will vary, as shown in Figure 1. Investments up to E, the
level that may be financed out of the foreign subsidiary's
earnings, should earn r1, with higher levels of investment
required to earn r2. We now turn to the relationships between
r1 and r.
Suppose, first, that the firm is in the position of making
a marginal investment which would involve retaining earnings—5—
versus repatriating them to the U.S. parent. In this case, it
is important to realize that the present value of liability
coming from deferrable taxes is not affected by the decision to
defer them. That is, the present values of the taxes due on
one dollar, if repatriated today, or on one dollar plus all the
earnings that that dollar generated in the intervening period,
if repatriation occurs later, are equal. The decision whether
to reinvest or repatriate should be invariant with respect to
the deferrable taxes. Thus, in deciding whether to reinvest
earnings or to repatriate them, an optimizing firm should con-
sider only the taxes arising from the standard foreign income
tax rate. The appropriate net rate of return of foreign
investment, to be compared across foreign countries and to be
compared with rates of return available in the U.S., should be
calculated ignoring withholding taxes imposed by the foreign
countries and any residual tax liability imposed on dividend
payments by the U.S. government. The appropriate net rate of
return for use in this comparison is thus r*nfi.
On the other hand, the firm transferring funds abroad does
not have an accumulated withholding or U.S. tax liability on
those funds, and should consider the fact that when it
repatriates the resulting earnings it may face additional
withholding taxes and U.S. income taxes. The calculation of
the after-tax rate of return in this case is highly complex,
depending upon the planned timing of future repatriations. For
example, if repatriation is expected to occur at a very distant—6—
time, the importance of that future tax liability diminishes,
and r2 approaches r1. If for some reason the firm expects to
repatriate exactly p of its earnings in every future period,
the formula given by equation (4) would be exactly correct.
Obviously, then, the future plans of the firm determine the
value of r2 in Figure 1.
If investment occurs as a result of a marginal decision
between retaining and repatriating earnings, multinational
firms should compare (across countries) the net—of—foreign—
income—tax rates of return across countries: the r*nfils. On
the other hand, if the investment is to take place through
transfers of earnings from the parent firm, the appropriate
net—of—tax rate of return is some combination of r*nfi and r*,
with expected future repatriation patterns determining the
weights. For example, if all earnings will be immediately
repatriated, only the rate net of all taxes, r*, is relevant.
In that case, deviations across countries in the rate of
corporate income taxation should have an impact on the location
of U.S. foreign direct investment only if they exceed the U.S.
rate. -
Ourempirical analysis tries to distinguish between the
two polar cases. One is the situation in which the effect of
the rate of return abroad and of the foreign corporate income
tax are such that r*(l_t*) is the appropriate variable. The
other is that deviations in t across countries would play no
role. In addition, it is possible to test, using a "typical"—7—
dividend repatriation ratio, whether firms respond to a
net—of--tax rate of return given by the traditional weighted
average formula.
The incentive effects of taxes due upon repatriation
differ strikingly in the two polar cases; the reason why is
intuitive. The deferred taxes act more as levies on the
transfer of funds back to the United States, rather than as
taxes on the earnings of capital abroad. Therefore, they would
be expected to have very different effects depending on whether
the funds are already located abroad, or whether a firm is
contemplating transferring funds from the United States. When
the funds are already in the hands of the foreign subsidiary, a
tax on transferring funds back to the parent firm becomes an
unavoidable cost, and does not influence the firm's optimal
investment decision. On the other hand, the same tax is
avoidable if the funds are not already located abroad, and is,
therefore, to some extent an investment disincentive. In the
next section, we turn to the measurement of these alternative
concepts of the net rate of return and to the investigation of
their impact on the location of foreign direct investment.
II. The Data
As part of its annual corporation income tax return, each
u.s. multinational firm files an "information return," form—8—
2952, for each of its "controlled foreign corporations."2
Assets, earnings and profits, taxes paid, a summary of intra—
firm transactions, and other figures are reported for every
foreign subsidiary. The U.S. Treasury Department has recently
made this information available for the years 1968 and 1972.
To preserve confidentiality, the data must be aggregated across
firms.
The data used in this study are a modified form of the
information published in IRS (l979). The main difference is
that our data are tabulated in a way which is more convenient
for our purposes. Table 1 lists the industry and country
groups by which the dataset in this study is cross—tabulated.
Of the 240 possible observations, 17 were suppressed for
confidentiality reasons. Another 27 observations exhibited
negative rates of return. Since these cases presumably are out
of equilibrium, and would create problems for some of our
functional forms, they are also dropped. Although the
resulting dataset is far from ideal, it is a considerable
improvement over previously available sources. Previous
empirical analyses have usually used one of two types of data.
2/ A subsidiary is a "controlled foreign corporation" if the
U.S. firm owns 50 percent or more of the stock. See,
I.R.S., U.S. Corporations and Their Controlled Foreign
Corporations (1979), pp. 202—203.
3/ We are grateful to the Treasury Department, Office of
International Tax Affairs, for making this dataset
available to us. Particularly helpful were Thomas Horst,
Jim Nunns, George Carlson, and Joe Parker.—9—
The first is information drawn from a small sample of firms.
Not only are questions raised by the small sample sizes, but
also many crucial variables., including those needed to
calculate rate of return, are typically missing.4 The other
approach relies on the U.S. national income accounts. The
problem here is that very little information is available by
country. Calculation of country—specific variables such as tax
rates is then difficult.5 The Treasury's data are drawn from
a large number of firms and contain some measure of each of the
key variables. Further, they are presented by both industry of
the firms and country of the subsidiaries. Thus, a wide range
of economic and statutory situations is covered.
Assets and Investment
The first variable to be drawn from this dataset is assets
of the foreign subsidiaries. Since assets in both 1968 and
1972 are available, net investment over the intervening four—
year period may be computed; this variable is used in the
dependent variable of each of the regressions discussed below.
The firms are required to use U.S. tax concepts when
reporting on their foreign subsidiaries, except that acceler-
ated depreciation may not be taken. In particular, assets are
4/ Examples include Snoy (1975) and Stevens (1969). Other —worksare surveyed in Hufbauer (1975), Kopits (1976), and
Ragazzi (1978).
5/ Examples are Prachowny (1972), Kwack (1972), Boatwright and
Renton (1975), Ladenson (1972), Hartman (1981b). See also
the surveys mentioned in the preceeding note.— 10—
basedon historic costs. Although it is not possible to cor-
rect the resulting mismeasurements directly, industry dummy
variables will be included in our empirical work to control for
possible differences in their severity by industry. Since the
firms' tax accounts are typically kept in U.S. dollars, the
extent of mismeasurements will probably not vary substantially
by country. Firms have the option, however, to keep their
records in any currency they choose, and convert to U.S.
dollars as the final step in their reporting.6 Since it is
not known what method each firm used, it is not possible to
correct the mismeasurements by country. For this reason, among
others, each equation is also run with country dummies.
The measurement problem due to differing inflation rates
should be less serious for a flow variable such as investment
than for a stock variable such as assets. The reason is that
exchange rates tend to offset the inflation rate differentials,
leaving only the U.S. rate of inflation. And, in a cross—
section analysis, this common factor is not a serious problem.
However, less than completely flexible exchange rates were
prevalent during our period. Therefore, we cannot be certain
that the tendency of inflation rates to be fully offset by
exchange rate movements serves to eliminate this problem. If
not, the implicit assumption made here that all investment
flows are consistently measured in nominal U.S. dollars may not
be valid.
6/ McDaniel and Ault (1977), p. 22.— 11—
Ratesof Return
The dataset contains information on the earnings and
profits of the foreign subsidiaries. Dividing these numbers by
the asset figures yields rates of return. Since income taxes
paid by the subsidiaries are also available, both gross of tax
and net of tax rates of return may be computed.
Interest payments by the subsidiaries are part of the
returns to assets and should be included in the calculation.
The information about intra—firm financial flows contained in
the dataset allows us to include interest paid by the subsidi—
aries to the parents. No information is given, however, about
debt or interest payments to unrelated parties. This omission
may not be a serious problem, since foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. firms typically had low and similar debt—equity ratios
during this period.7
In the next section, we will test whether rates of return
in 1968 influenced changes in assets between 1968 and 1972.
Only 1968 rates of return will be used, in order to avoid a
simultaneity problem. In any one year, levels of assets and
rates of return are of course determined simultaneously. But
net rate of return opportunities in one year are likely to
cause adjustments that begin that year and extend into the
future.
7/ A Commerce Department survey indicates that total interest
payments by the subsidiaries, including payments to
parents, accounted for only 14.6 percent of net income
before taxes plus interest in 1966. See U.S. Department of
Commerce (1972), pp. 173, 174, and 177.— 12—
Two assumptionsare necessary for this disequilibrium
analysis to be appropriate. First is that levels of assets do
not adjust instantaneously to net rates of return. If they
did, then changes induced by the rates of return in 1968 would
happen in that year, and none of the changes occurring from
then to 1972 would be related to them. Since the subject of
the analysis is long—term investment in manufacturing, this
assumption does not seem troubling.
Secondly, it is necessary that differences in net rates of
return in 1968 represent real divergences from equilibrium. It
is possible that they exist to compensate for risks or other
factors. Or, they may be caused by random or very short—lived
phenomena, and are recognized as such by the firms. In either
case, they would not cause adjustments to capital stocks. What
we hope to capture in our rate of return variables are recent
changes in tax rates, factor costs, relative prices, and other
real economic forces which would influence investment
decisions. However, the disparities in net rate of return in
1968 that do not represent departures from equilibrium bias the
coefficients toward zero, since they represent a typical
"errors in variables" problem.
Taxes Paid
Our data also include income taxes paid to foreign
governments. In addition, a measure of "withholding taxes" on
intra—firm dividends, interest, and royalties is available.
Table 2 presents effective tax rates, defined as foreign income— 13—
andwithholding taxes divided by earnings and profits.8 The
tax rates show considerable variation, by industry and by
country. For example, tax rates for the electrical equipment
industry varied between 20 percent and 60 percent in 1972; for
fabricated metal products from under 10 percent to 54 percent;
and for scientific instruments from 30 percent to over 90 per-
cent. It is plausible, therefore, that tax disparities are
large enough to affect the firms' decisions.
This wide range of tax situations is the principle virtue
of this set of data. Some observers, looking at more highly
aggregated data, have concluded that international tax dis-
parities are not large enough to be important.9 Table 3
further illustrates the problem. The first two columns show
the basic statutory corporate income tax rates.1° The last
two columns display effective corporate income tax rates
computed from our data. Even the effective tax rates show much
less variation than was apparent in the industry—country cross—
8/ Cells containing firms with both positive and negative
profits would pose a problem for this table. The cell
would show positive taxes, since the firms with losses
would not ordinarily receive rebates, while profitable
firms would pay tax. Total profits could be negative;
hence, a spurious negative tax rate could result.
Therefore, only subsidiaries with positive earnings and
profits were included when Table 2 was computed.
9/ "But there are numerous reasons for assuming that the
influence of (taxes) is slight. The long—term investor
is bound to weight a few percentage points in an existing
tax rate as an economic factor of only trivial signifi-
cance." Vernon (1977), p. 127.
10/ Statutory tax rates are from Kyrouz (1975).— 14—
section.Thirteen out of 16 numbers in each column are in the
35 percent to 55 percent range. it is important, therefore, to
look at more detailed information than just country—wide
averages when judging the extent to which tax rates differ.
The tax rates differ more when disaggregated by industry
as well as country because provisions of the tax law other than
the basic statutory rate affect industries differently. For
example, capital—intensive industries are especially affected
by accelerated depreciation and other capital cost recovery
incentives. Industries utilizing short—lived equipment benefit
more from investment tax credit schemes. Furthermore, some
countries select certain industries for encouragement, giving
them special tax relief. These types of provisions differ sub-
stantially across countries. Therefore, two countries with
identical statutory rates, and even with the same effective
rates overall, could have very different rates on individual
industries. Substantial incentives could then exist which
would affect firms' location decisions.
It would be interesting to analyze the various corporate
tax structures in order to isolate the disparities in the
effective tax rates. A two—step analysis is called for.
First, the main statutory provisions of each country would L
identified and summarized. Second, characteristics of each
industry that govern how the statutory provisions affect it
would be summarized. Capital intensity, average life of the
capital, and use of intra—firm debt and equity are examples of— 15—
suchcharacteristics. In effect, a stylized representation of
typical operations in each industry would be constructed.
Then, each stylized summary of the industries' operations could
be subjected to summaries of the countries tax statutes. The
result would be true marginal tax rates on each type of project
in each country.
This analysis would undoubtedly yield useful insights on
the disparities in the taxation of U.S. multinationals abroad.
In addition, the resulting tax rates might be better suited to
the empirical analysis than the effective tax rates used here,
for reasons outlined in the next paragraph. The procedure is
beyond the scope of this study. Particularly the first step,
summarizing the various sets of tax provisions, would be a
major undertaking. Rather, we use our estimates of foreign
taxes paid, and leave consideration of statutory provisions for
future research.
The most obvious type of statutory provision affecting
investment incentives is the treatment of investment expendi-
tures themselves. Examples include investment tax credits or
grants and the acceleration of allowable depreciation. These
provisions imply that investment in any one year reduces taxes
paid, and thus effective tax rates, in that year. Attempting
to explain investment in one year with tax rates calculated
from that year's tax returns would lead to simultaneity bias.
This study uses effective tax rates from one year, 1968, to
explain investment that took place over the next four years, so
the strict simultaneity problem is avoided.— 16—
Arelated problem arises, however, if investment contains
a strong autoregressive element. Then investment from 1968 to
1972 would be a function of investment that took place in
1968. Attempting to explain investment between 1968 and 1972
with 1968 tax rates would then lead to bias if 1968 investment
were not also included. The straightforward solution, inclu-
sion of 1968 investment in the analysis, is impossible here
because the necessary data are unavailable. A measure of tax
rates based on statutory provisions would avoid this problem,
since they would presumably not be a function of contempora-
neous investment by U.S. firms.
To summarize, the basic measures of tax incentives used in
this study are average, effective foreign tax rates. As is
discussed in the previous section, residual U.S. tax liabili-
ties arising from the foreign tax credit mechanism and from
foreign withholding taxes may or may not have further effects
on the firms' decisions. It is clear that, if subsidiaries pay
dividends, these taxes will, in general, have to be paid. It
is not clear, however, whether the vast majority of U.S. firms
should be expected to respond to these extra liabilities.
To examine this question, the empirical analysis considers
a measure of the extra taxes on foreign source income due to
the repatriation of earnings. It is calculated from the data
on intra—firm financial flows and foreign taxes paid. First,
withholding tax rates, as modified by existing treaties, are
applied to the flows. Second, a measure of tax due to the— 17—
U.S.is computed. Specifically, for each industry—country
cell, intra—firm interest and royalty payments are subjected to
the U.S. corporate tax rate in 1968 of 48 percent, as are
"grossed up" dividends defined by a "typical" payout rate. The
share of foreign taxes attributable to distributed profits are
then subtracted. The result, if nonnegative, is the measure of
extra taxes owed to the U.S. Negative values are set to
zero.
This procedure is, admittedly, only a simple
representation of the foreign tax credit mechanism. It
neglects many complexities in actual tax practice.12 For
example, issues raised by the "overall limitation method" are
ignored.13 In most instances, U.S. firms add up financial
flows from taxes paid by all their subsidiaries before applying
the foreign tax credit mechanism. The calculations done here,
since they treat each industry—country cell independently, are
closer in spirit to the "per country method," under which firms
would compute U.S. tax for each country separately. The two
methods can yield different results when some subsidiaries of a
given firm are subject to high foreign taxes, and others to low
ones. Thus, the simple representation of U.S. taxes used in
11/ The model for these calculations is the concise summary of
the foreign tax credit mechanism contained in pp. 152—154
of I.R.S., (1979).
12/ For descriptions of the U.S. foreign tax mechanism, see
McDaniel and Ault (1977) and Hufbauer and Foster (1976).
13/ See Horst (1979) for a detailed treatment of this issue.— 18—
thisstudy will not exactly represent the marginal liability
faced by some firms. Since we have insufficient data to cal-
culate an "overall method" tax parameter, it is reassuring that
the differences appear small.14
III. The Evidence
The data just described allow for a series of simple tests
of tax effects on the location of U.S. investment abroad. As
noted in the previous section, investment over the 1968—72
period across industries and countries is to be explained based
on the corresponding net rate of return in 1968. We first test
three alternative models in which investment is taken as a
function, in turn, of: a) the gross rate of return, b) the
rate of return, net of currently paid foreign taxes, and c) the
rate of return, net of all taxes (including foreign withholding
taxes and U.S. taxes on a typical fraction of earnings
repatriated).
The results are shown in the first three lines of Table
4. The dependent variable is the growth rate of investment
over the four—year period, Comparing line 1 to either of the
next two lines shows that taxes definitely do play a major role
in the firms' location of investment decisions. The net rate
14/ Frisch (1981) reconsiders this problem using much the same
data. It is a simulation study of taxes on foreign source
income and, in constructing the simulation model, builds in
a simple approximation of ownership across countries. The
difference between "overall" and "per—country" methods is
computed, and is found to be small in practice.— 19—
ofreturn variables can explain a significant, although not
overwhelming, portion of variation in foreign direct investment
by industry and country. The coefficients of lines 2 and 3
imply that an increase in net rate of return by one percentage
point is associated with approximately a 12 percent increase in
assets in that industry and country.
The theory sketched out in Section I leads one to expect
that currently paid foreign taxes would be of overriding
concern to most U.S. firms. Comparing lines 2 and..3 appears to
confirm this expectation. The rate of return with only current
taxes netted out performs better, as can be seen by comparing
R2 or the standard error of the estimate.
The next three specifications are designed to examine the
role of taxes more closely. In the simplest case, a net rate
of return variable equals r*(l_t*). This variable may be
separated into two linear components, r* and r*t*. The former
is of course gross rate of return, and the latter may be
calculated as the ratio of tax payments to assets. Placing
both in a regression allows a further test of the hypothesis
that firms respond to net rate of return incentives; if so, the
former component should have a positive coefficient, and the
latter an equal one with opposite sign.
Line 4 of Table 4 presents the results of decomposing the
net rate of return variable used in line 2. Both coefficients
are highly significant and have the expected sign. It is clear
that firms respond to both gross rate of return and tax
incentives in the manner expected.— 20—
Thecoefficients are clearly not identically equal in
absolute value. However, the difference between them may not
be statistically significant. Line 2 is a restricted form of
line 4; comparing the sum of squared residuals allows the
implicit restriction to be tested. The proper F—statistic for
doing so is reported at the end of line 4J5 The hypothesis
that the net rate of return specification (as in line 2) is the
correct one is not rejected at the 1 percent level, although it
is at the 5 percent level. Inclusion of industry and country
effects is discussed below. Industry effects do not change the
story, but when country intercepts are included, the
coefficients of the tax variables are significantly larger (in
absolute value) than the coefficient of gross rate of return.
In summary, the evidence is mixed on whether the net rate of
return specification is preferred.
The alternative conclusion seems to be that tax
disincentives are more powerful than are gross rate of return
incentives. Recall that the errors—in—variables problem
discussed above will bias the coefficients toward zero; this
effect may well be more significant for the gross rate of
return variable. More generally, there may be more noise in
this variable, since statutory provisions help determine the
tax variables. Perhaps the conclusion from this line of tests
15/ In parentheses underneath are degrees of freedom. Critical
values are, for the 1% level, F(l,200)6.63 and
F(2,200)=4.6l. For the 5% level, F(l,200)=3.84 and
F(2, 200)=3. 00.— 21—
shouldbe that both gross rate of return and taxes affect
decisions as expected, but that precise comparison of relative
magnitudes must await further research.
Lines 5 and 6 of Table 4 consider the deferrable taxes.
Line 5, which splits out the measure of all taxes, is inferior
to line 4, which includes current taxes only. More striking
evidence about the relative importance of these two types of
taxes is provided in line 6. Here, currently paid taxes and
deferrable taxes, both as a ratio to assets, are entered
separately. The deferrable tax variable is insignificant and
has the wrong sign. As predicted by the discussion in Section
I, taxes occasioned by the firms' repatriation decisions seem
to be irrelevant for their investment decisions.
The final group of specifications in Table 4 allow for
different intercepts for industry and country groups. Each of
the first six specifications in Table 4 was rerun with these
intercepts. To save space, only the most complete specifica-
tions (as in line 6) are displayed; the results for the other
specifications are similar.
Industry groups differ in many characteristics that may
affect the rate of overseas investment, such as average firm
size, labor intensity of production and use of advanced
technologyJ6 In addition, the extent to which historic cost
16/ Any of which may be only partly captured in the gross rate
of return. For a discussion of these issues, see Caves
(1971) and Horst (1972). Continuing work by Frisch is
analyzing the role of technology in more detail.— 22—
datamismeasure assets is expected to vary by industry.
Countries may differ in non—tax government interferences, the
extent to which exchange rate movements cause measurement
errors, and risk.17 In sum, each set of dummy variables may
be expected to be strongly related to rates of investment.
This fact is borne out by the increases in R2 when they are
included. It is clear that much work remains to be done in
identifying the determinants of foreign investment by U.S.
firms. The intercepts for the specifications in lines (7) and
(8) are presented in Table 5.
The crucial question for the present study is, how
sensitive are the conclusions about net rate of return to these
dummy variables? The answer is, not very. Inclusion of the
industry dummies has particularly small effects on the rate of
return and tax coefficients.
When country dummies are included, there is more of a
change, but the basic conclusions are left intact. The
coefficient of gross rate of return becomes slightly larger.
The measure of currently payable taxes shows more of a change;
it becomes more negative. As is discussed above, the tax
coefficients now become significantly different (in absolute
value) from the ones for gross rate of return. Finally, the
measure of deferrable taxes is still insignificantly different
from zero, but now shows the sign predicted by theory in the
last line.
17/ Continuing work by Hartman is looking at the effects of
risk, in a portfolio allocation framework.— 23—
Insum, these results indicate that U.S. firms respond to
properly specified net rate of return incentives. It is pos-
sible that the results are sensitive to the functional form
chosen for Table 4. All variables (except intercepts, of
course) are computed by dividing some quantity by assets in
1968. Random errors in assets could be causing some sort of
spurious correlation, therefore. Although this possibility
would not seem to explain the significant negative coefficients
on the tax variables, it is worth investigating.
Accordingly, a different functional form was tried; Table
6 presents the results. The dependent variable is log of
assets in 1972. Log of 1968 assets is added as an independent
variable, to control for starting points. Net profits, gross
profits, and tax payments, all in log form, are the other
independent variables; the same types of intercepts are also
used.
The basic conclusions are unaffected, although
significance levels are now lower on lines 1 through 3, which
use net rates of return. In lines 4 through 9, which display
the more complete specifications, both gross earnings and
currently payable taxes show the same signs as before and are
significant at the 1 percent level. Deferrable taxes show a
negative sign, and are never significantly difficult from
zero. As before, these results are not sensitive to the
inclusion of dummy variables. Table 7 presents the intercepts
for each industry and each country, from the specifications in
lines (7) and (8), respectively.— 24—
IV.Conclusions
This paper describes the results of an empirical
investigation into the determinants of the location of U.S.
investment abroad. Because our data come from an industry—
country crosstabulation, we observe substantial variation not
only in rates of return but also in effective tax rates. This
variation has been obscured in previous cross—section studies.
We have been able, given this new body of information, to
confirm that a significant part, though far from a majority, of
the pattern in foreign direct investment across industries and
countries can be accounted for by net rate of return incen-
tives. Furthermore, the gross rate of return and the currently
payable tax variable have been shown to be significant when
introduced separately, confirming the importance of tax
effects. Our results indicate that a one percentage point
increase in the net rate of return caused by a decline in the
effective local corporate tax rate increases investment in that
country by more than 30 percent over a four—year period.
Changes in the net rate of return caused by factors other than
taxes may have smaller impacts.
Finally, our results suggest that "deferrable" taxes —
localwithholding taxes as well as U.S. taxes net of foreign
tax credits —arenot important determinants of the location of
investment. This finding is consistent with the discussion of
tax incentives laid out in this paper and more fully in a





Investment in the U.S.Table 1
Industry Groups and Countries
A. Industry
Groups
1. Food and kindred products (FOOD)
2. Textile and apparel products (TEXTIL)
3. Lumber and paper products ('LUMBER')
4. Printing and publishing (PRINT)
5. Chemicals and allied products ('CHEM)
6. Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products (RUBBER'
7. Stone, clay, and glass products (STONE)
8. Primary metal industries VPRIM'
9. Fabricated metal industries (PRIM'
10. Machinery, eccept electrical VMACH)
11. Electrical machinery 'ELEC)
12. Motor vehicles and equipment VM0TOR')
13. Transportation euipment, except motor vehicles (TRANSP)
14. Scientific instruments, photographic euipment, watches,
and clocks ( SCIENT












10. WestGermany (GERM )
11. Spain
12. Swit7erland VSWITZ)
13. United Kingdom (U.K.)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Intercepts from Table 4
A. Industry Groups (Line 7)
Industry Intercept(Standard Error)
1. Food 0.69 (0.66)
2. Textile, apparel 0.93 (0.71)
3. Lumber, paper 1.11 (0.80)
4. Printing, publishing —0.76 (1.07)
5. Chemicals 0.06 (0.64)
6. Rubber 0.02 (0.74)
7.Stone, clay, glass —0.23 (0.67)
8. Primary metal 1.65 (0.64)
9. Fabricated metal 0.17 (0.65)
10. Machinery, except electrical 0.60 (0.73)
11. Electrical machinery 0.94 (0.69)
12. Motor vehicles 0.25 (0.64)
13. Other transportation equipment 2.58 (0.69)
14. Scientific equipment —0.02 (0.69)
15. Other 1.26 (0.67)
B. Countries (Line 8)
Country Intercept(Standard Error)
1. Canada 0.53 (0.59)
2. Mexico 0.79 (0.65)
3. Argentina —0.11 (0.69)
4. Brazil 0.64 (0.63)
5. Venezuela —0.20 (0.61)
6. Belgium 1.15 (0.67)
7. France 1.24 (0.67)
8. Italy 2.63 (0.61)
9. Netherlands 2.87 (0.68)
10. Germany 1.67 (0.64)
11. Spain 1.00 (0.89)
12. Switzerland 0.11 (0.61)
13. United Kingdom 0.96 (0.59)
14. South Africa —0.25 (0.77)
15. Japan 4.37 (0.86)
16. Australia 1.38 (0.66)Table 7
Intercepts from Table 6
A. Industry Groups (Line 7)
Industry Intercept(Standard Error)
1.Food 2.15 (0.73)
2.Textile, apparel 2.04 (0.70)
3. Lumber, paper 2.21 (0.67)
4. Printing, publishing 1.75 (0.68)
5. Chemicals 2.15 (0.75)
6. Rubber 1.96 (0.72)
7. Stone, clay, glass 1.72 (0.69)
8. Primary metal 2.19 (0.71)
9. Fabricated metal 1.81 (0.72)
10. Machinery, except electrical 2.41 (0.73)
11. Electrical machinery 2.36 (0.73)
12. Motor vehicles 1.95 (0.77)
13. Other transportation equipment 2.18 (0.69)
14. Scientific equipment 1.89 (0.70)
15. Other 2.03 (0.69)
B. Countries (Line 8)
Country Intercept (Standard Error)
1. Canada 1.61 (0.64)
2. Mexico 1.47 (0.59)
3. Argentina 1.18 (0.59)
4. Brazil 1.73 (0.58)
5. Venezuela 1.08 (0.59)
6. Belgium 1.74 (0.59)
7. France 1.79 (0.61)
8. Italy 1.88 (0.61)
9. Netherlands 2.32 (0.57)
10. Germany 1.98 (0.59)
11. Spain 1.79 (0.58)
12. Switzerland 1.47 (0.60)
13. United Kingdom 1.69 (0.62)
14. South Africa 1.18 (0.57)
15. Japan 2.09 (0.58)
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